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COMMENTS 
A LIE IS A LIE: AN ARGUMENT FOR 
STRICT PROTECTION AGAINST A 
PROSECUTOR’S KNOWING USE OF 
PERJURED TESTIMONY 
Charlie DeVore*
Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence, nor for that matter 
in the Federalist or in any other writing of the Founding Fathers, can one find a single 
utterance that could justify a decision by any oath-beholden servant of the law to look 
the other way when confronted by the real possibility of being complicit in the 





A criminal prosecutor is simultaneously an adversary of the defense 
and an agent of the sovereign.  In dealing with testimony or evidence 
favorable to a criminal defendant, these roles of the prosecutor have 
conflicting incentives.  As an adversary, the prosecutor is interested in 
achieving a courtroom victory and convincing the fact-finder of the strength 
of his argument.  As an agent of the sovereign, however, a prosecutor’s 
interest must be steadfast, both in convicting the guilty and in acquitting the 
innocent.  The Supreme Court has noted that “though the attorney for the 
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must 
always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that justice shall be 
done.”2  The prosecutor is the servant of the law, which has the twofold aim 
that “guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”3
A zeal for victory has, from time to time, led prosecutors to knowingly 
present false testimony in pursuit of criminal convictions.  When a 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; M.A. in Teaching, 
Johns Hopkins University, 2005; B.A. in English, University of Missouri, 2002. 
1 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
2 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
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prosecutor uses perjured testimony to convict a criminal defendant, that 
criminal defendant’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been violated.4  However, a 
reviewing court must determine that the perjured testimony actually 
affected the defendant’s trial in order to reverse the case.5
Both sides of the circuit split acknowledge that the perjured testimony 
must be material to the trial.  The Supreme Court established the standard 
of materiality for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony in 
Giglio v. United States: “A new trial is required if the false testimony 
could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury.”
  A circuit split 
has developed around the issue of what test is appropriate to determine 
when the impact of a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony is 
significant enough to warrant reversal of the conviction. 
6  However, circuit courts disagree on what should be done after false 
testimony is found to be material under the Giglio standard.  The Ninth 
Circuit has held that the finding of materiality under Giglio necessarily 
compels reversal.7  The court foreclosed the idea of any further analysis 
after a finding of materiality by asserting that once the Supreme Court has 
declared a materiality standard for a particular type of constitutional error, 
there is no need to conduct further analysis.8  The First and Sixth Circuits, 
however, have adopted a two-step analysis in determining whether a 
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony compels reversal of a 
conviction.  First, the court must find that the perjured testimony meets the 
Giglio materiality standard, and then the court must determine whether, 
despite a finding of materiality, the use of perjured testimony can be 
dismissed as harmless error.9
 
4 See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (stating that a “deliberate 
deception of [the] court” by the presentation of perjured testimony is a deprivation of due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States). 
  The harmless error analysis is more 
restrictive and makes reversal less likely than under the Ninth Circuit’s 
singular materiality test.  This Comment argues that a two-step analysis is 
inappropriate because it has no foundation in Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
violates the due process rights of criminal defendants, and removes an 
incentive for prosecutors to be vigilant in ensuring that they do not present 
false testimony. 
5 See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957). 
6 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
8 Id. 
9 See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 
F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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The Comment will begin in Part II with a discussion of the cases that 
established and developed the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s 
knowing use of false testimony.  Early cases addressing this topic held that 
a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony was unconstitutional and 
thus appropriate grounds for reversal.10  Later cases established and refined 
the materiality standard for knowing use of perjured testimony.11
II. DEVELOPING THE RULE AGAINST A PROSECUTOR’S KNOWING USE OF 
FALSE TESTIMONY 
  Part III 
analyzes the cases comprising the circuit split, including the differing 
factual scenarios and the adequacy of the justifications presented for the 
reasoning in each case.  In Part IV, this Comment argues that the two-step 
analysis used by the First and Sixth Circuits is inappropriate.  Subpart A 
asserts that the two-step test is not supported by Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and, further, that the test allows the more restrictive harmless 
error standard to swallow the carefully calculated materiality standard.  
Subpart B argues that the two-step test is not sufficiently protective of the 
due process rights of criminal defendants and that it diminishes the 
incentive for prosecutors to ensure that they do not present false testimony.  
This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit 
split and establish that where a prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony at trial and the false testimony was material, there should be no 
further harmless error analysis. 
A. THE SEMINAL CASES  
The Supreme Court first addressed a prosecutor’s knowing use of false 
testimony in Mooney v. Holohan.12  There, the Supreme Court asserted that 
a prosecutor violates due process if he presents false testimony or 
deliberately suppresses evidence favorable to the accused.13
 
10 See, e.g., Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31 (see infra notes 
  The Court 
stated: 
16–23 and accompanying text); Pyle 
v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (see infra note 15); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 
103 n.2 (1935) (see infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text). 
11 As mentioned above, in Giglio the Supreme Court established the materiality standard 
that still applies today.  “A new trial is required if the false testimony could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”  Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12 294 U.S. 103 (1935).  This case was before the Supreme Court on Mooney’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to obtain immediate 
relief from unlawful confinement by challenging the constitutionality of his or her conviction 
or sentence.  Id. 
13 In Mooney, the Court was prompted to address the due process concerns to answer the 
California attorney general’s claim that a prosecutor could only violate due process if he 
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[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice 
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which 
in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate 
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.  
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a 
defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the 
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.14
In these two sentences, the Court laid the foundation for the argument 
that a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony is a violation of the due 




In Alcorta v. Texas, the Supreme Court advanced the jurisprudence 
regarding a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in two 
important ways.
 
16  First, the Court found that the prosecutor’s failure to 
correct false testimony was tantamount to the knowing presentation of false 
testimony.17  Second, the Court, for the first time, did what can accurately 
be described as a materiality analysis.18  In Alcorta, the Supreme Court, 
relying on Mooney and Pyle, held that a prosecutor’s knowing presentation 
of false testimony violated due process.19  The prosecutor in this case 
artfully asked questions of the key witness to avoid revealing facts that 
would support the defense’s theory that the defendant committed murder 
under the influence of sudden passion from adequate cause.20
 
deprived a defendant of notice or prevented a defendant from presenting “such evidence as 
he has,” and that an allegation of a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony therefore 
did not raise a federal question.  Id. at 110–12.  
  The Court 
held that the prosecutor’s behavior at trial obscured the truth and was 
therefore equivalent to presenting false testimony.  This holding reinforced 
the importance of protecting the criminal defendant from a prosecutor’s use 
of false testimony.  A violation was found not where a prosecutor presented 
false testimony but where he had artfully asked questions to obscure the 
truth.  Further, the Court did a materiality analysis, though it did not ascribe 
14 Id. 
15 The Supreme Court relied on Mooney seven years later in granting relief to the 
petitioner where a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony.  Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (“These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release 
from his present custody.”). 
16 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
17 See id. at 31. 
18 Id. at 31–32. 
19 Id. 
20 Under Texas law at the time, sudden passion was a partial defense, and a killing in 
these circumstances would be considered murder without malice, punishable by a maximum 
of five years imprisonment.  Id. at 29. 
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this label to the analysis.  The Court held that the “petitioner was not 
accorded due process of law,”21 and then went on to explore the 
prosecutor’s withholding of information known to him, and the likely 
outcome if the truth had been revealed to the jury.22  The Court concluded 
that had the prosecutor not presented false testimony, the offense would 
likely have been reduced to “murder without malice,” and thus would have 
received a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment rather than the 
death penalty.23
The Court’s materiality analysis in Alcorta foreshadowed scenarios in 
which a court could conceivably find that a due process violation was so 
minor as not to require reversal.  The Court’s analysis of the likely impact 
of revealing the truth to the jury, followed by an order reversing the case, 
indicates that the Court did not establish a rule of per se reversal, but rather 
a rule inviting some analysis of impact of a prosecutor’s knowing 
presentation of perjured testimony. 
  
B. ESTABLISHING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT TRIGGER 
MATERIALITY 
In Napue v. Illinois, the Supreme Court found that prosecutors are 
prohibited from using false testimony both when the false testimony applies 
to the defendant’s guilt and when it applies to a witness’s credibility.24  In 
Napue, the key witness for the State testified falsely that he had not 
received any consideration or promise in return for his testimony.25  The 
prosecutor failed to correct this testimony.26
The Supreme Court reiterated that where a conviction is obtained 
through the State’s knowing presentation of false testimony, there has been 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; further, this result is the same 
whether the State solicits the false testimony or allows false testimony to go 




21 Id. at 31. 
  The Court stressed that the prohibition on a 
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony “does not cease to apply 
merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the 
22 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957). 
23 Id. at 32. 
24 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
25 Id. at 265.  At the time that the witness testified, he was serving a jail sentence of 199 
years.  The assistant state’s attorney prosecuting the case felt that in order to obtain a 
conviction, he would need the testimony from the witness, who had aided in the crime that 
led to a murder.  He promised the witness that he would do everything possible to reduce the 
witness’s current sentence in exchange for the witness’s testimony.  Id. at 266–67. 
26 Id. at 265. 
27 Id. at 269. 
672 CHARLIE DEVORE [Vol. 101 
witness.”28  Both evidence relating to a defendant’s guilt and evidence 
relating to the credibility of a witness may be critical in a jury’s 
determination of guilt or innocence: “it is upon such subtle factors as the 
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or 
liberty may depend.”29
It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather 
than directly upon defendant’s guilt.  A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it 
is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty 
to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth. . . .  That the district 
attorney’s silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for 
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be 
termed fair.
  To adequately determine whether a witness is 
testifying truthfully, a jury must know whether the witness has received 
some consideration for his testimony.  In underscoring the importance of 
evidence that relates to a witness’s credibility, the Court stated: 
30
In addition, the Court considered whether evidence of the false 
testimony was cumulative.
 
31  Lower courts asserted that the false testimony 
regarding consideration in exchange for testimony had a diminished impact 
because the jury had been presented with testimony that a lawyer from the 
public defender’s office was “going to do what he could” for the witness.32  
Thus, lower courts reasoned, the jury had been presented with a potential 
motivation for the witness to testify falsely against the petitioner.  The 
Supreme Court concluded, however, that the jury would likely attach more 
weight to the truth, that the State had made a promise of consideration and 
the witness was likely trying to “curry the favor” of the State by 
testifying.33
Though the Court in Napue mentioned the materiality standard of 
whether “the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have 





 it failed to apply this standard or to 
establish a materiality standard for future cases involving a prosecutor’s 
knowing use of false testimony.  The Court found that the prosecutor 
violated Napue’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 269–70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854–55 (N.Y. 1956)). 
31 “[W]e do not believe that the fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for 
believing that the witness Hamer may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner 
turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.”  Napue, 360 U.S. at 270. 
32 Id. at 265. 
33 Id. at 270. 
34 The Court mentioned this materiality standard in reference to the State’s brief, which 
argued that the Court was bound by the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that the 
constitutional violation did not rise to this standard.  Id. at 271. 
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holding that “the false testimony used by the State in securing the 
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the 
trial.”35
In Brady v. Maryland, the Court expanded and clarified constitutional 
prohibitions on a prosecutor’s withholding of evidence favorable to a 
defendant and established that due process rights are violated where 
withheld evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.
  This standard established that a determination of materiality was 
appropriate, i.e., that the prosecutor’s use of false testimony must be 
significant enough to be deemed a violation of due process rights, but 
provided little guidance for evaluating materiality in future cases.  The 
phrase “may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial” implies that 
some analysis must be done but provides no prospective standard for 
establishing whether a defendant’s rights have been violated. 
36  This case 
did not involve a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony but 
rather a prosecutor who suppressed the confession of a defendant’s 
confederate, Boblit.  At trial, Brady had admitted to being involved in a 
murder but argued that his confederate delivered the fatal blow.37  Thus, the 
petitioner conceded to being guilty of first-degree murder and asked the 
jury only to foreclose the possibility of capital punishment.38  Despite the 
petitioner’s trial counsel’s specific request to examine Boblit’s extrajudicial 
statements, the prosecutor withheld the statement that would have been 
most helpful to the defense.39  Since the petitioner was charged with felony 
murder and admitted to being involved in the perpetration of the crime that 
ended in the killing, the suppressed confession was not relevant to guilt or 
innocence, but just to punishment.40  On these grounds, the court of appeals 
held that there had been no constitutional violation, as the petitioner would 
have been found guilty regardless of the confession.41
Citing the cases detailed above, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
“suppression of this confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause 
 
 
35 Id. at 272 (emphasis added). 
36 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
37 Id. at 84. 
38 In Maryland at the time, the jury was responsible both for determining guilt and for 
noting on the verdict form whether capital punishment was recommended for a murder 
conviction.  Id. at 89. 
39 “Several of those statements were shown to him; but one dated July 9, 1958, in which 
Boblit admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to 
petitioner’s notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced.”  Id. at 84. 
40 Felony murder is “[m]urder that occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (9th ed. 2009).  Since Brady admitted to being involved in 
the felony that led to the murder, under the felony-murder rule he was considered guilty of 
the murder as well. 
41 Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.”42  The Court expanded this due process 
protection which had been rooted in a violation involving a prosecutor’s 
knowing presentation of false testimony, stating: “We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”43  The materiality analysis was initially conceived in the cases 
involving the knowing use of perjured testimony at trial, but in Brady the 
Court brought the concept to fruition in the context of a prosecutor 
withholding evidence at the discovery phase.  The Court rooted this holding 
in the same principle that underlies the preceding decisions, namely that 
“[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in 
the courts.”44  A prosecutor has simultaneous and potentially conflicting 
roles as an adversary of the defense and an agent of a sovereign.  With 
Brady and those cases that precede it, the Court placed great emphasis on 
the prosecutor’s role as a seeker of the truth, especially when that truth is 
exculpatory to a criminal defendant.45  “Society wins not only when the 
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”46
The Court was aware of the broad and far-reaching effects of the 





42 Id. at 86. 
  However, despite the Court’s implicit recognition that 
it was creating a watershed constitutional rule relating to criminal trial 
practice, nothing in the Brady opinion indicates that the Court foresaw the 
controversy that would develop regarding the differences between the 
knowing presentation of false testimony and the withholding of evidence 
favorable to the accused at the discovery phase.  These situations are 
analytically similar in that they both involve a prosecutor withholding 
evidence that is helpful to the accused, but they are procedurally quite 
43 Id. at 87. 
44 Id. 
45 For an interesting assessment of Brady’s disclosure rule in the context of plea 
bargaining, see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and 
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001). 
46 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A 
Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to 
the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 307 (2010) (“In Brady, the Court made clear that 
its paramount interest was the protection of an accused individual’s right to a fair trial.”). 
47 In any event the Court’s due process advice goes substantially beyond the holding below.  I 
would employ more confining language and would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of 
criminal discovery.  Instead, I would leave this task, at least for now, to the rule-making or 
legislative process after full consideration by legislators, bench, and bar. 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 92 (White, J., concurring). 
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different.  In the Brady context, the prosecutor has withheld evidence that 
would be helpful to the defendant, while in the perjured testimony context 
the prosecutor has either elicited or failed to correct statements in open 
court that he knew were false at the time they were uttered.  Later opinions 
clarified the difficulties embedded in this difference.48  It is more 
challenging to identify retrospectively what evidence a prosecutor should 
have turned over to the defense than it is to determine when a prosecutor 
should have corrected testimony he knew to be false at trial.  Put another 
way, there is less ambiguity about whether a prosecutor has violated the due 
process rights of a criminal defendant where the prosecutor has knowingly 
presented false testimony in open court.49
Though the Court in Brady did not set a specific standard for 
materiality when a prosecutor has suppressed evidence favorable to the 
accused, it did establish that due process is violated where “evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment,”
 
50
C. SETTING DIFFERING STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY FOR PERJURED 
TESTIMONY AND WITHHELD EVIDENCE CLAIMS 
 leaving the question of a 
materiality standard to be established in future decisions. 
Nine years after the Brady decision, the Court established the 
materiality standard for determining a constitutional violation in the context 
of a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in Giglio v. 
United States.51  In Giglio, a witness had been promised that he would not 
be prosecuted if he cooperated with the Government.52  This promise was 
made by an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who did not have the 
authority to make such a promise and who was not responsible for trying 
the case.53  The AUSA who actually tried the case had no knowledge that 
such a promise had been made to the testifying witness.54
 
48 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 
(1985) (see infra notes 
  The Court held 
that the promise was attributable to the Government, and thus the 
84–90 and accompanying text). 
49 Compare Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (see supra notes 16–23 and 
accompanying text) (finding an unconstitutional breach of due process for the knowing use 
of perjured testimony where a prosecutor artfully asked questions to avoid revealing a 
witness’s sexual relationship with defendant’s wife), with Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97 (see infra 
notes 62–83 and accompanying text) (finding no violation of due process where the 
prosecutor withheld pertinent parts of the victim’s criminal record that would have supported 
the defense of self-defense). 
50 373 U.S. at 87. 
51 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
52 Id. at 151. 
53 Id. at 152. 
54 Id. 
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prosecuting AUSA had “constructive knowledge” of the promise that had 
been made to the witness.55  At trial, this prosecutor elicited testimony that 
the witness had not received any consideration in exchange for his 
testimony at trial.56  Despite the fact that the prosecutor was not aware at 
the time that this testimony was in fact false, the Court held that the 
Government was responsible for knowledge of the unauthorized promise.57  
Constructively, the prosecutor had knowingly used false testimony.58
In Giglio, the Court articulated the standard of materiality for a 
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony.  The Court focused on the 
fundamental fairness of the trial of the accused by reiterating Brady’s rule 
that “suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial ‘irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’”
 
59  With this foundation, the 
Court established the standard for materiality in this context: “A new trial is 
required if the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have 
affected the judgment of the jury.”60  After articulating this materiality 
standard, the Court held that the knowing presentation of false testimony in 
Giglio met the standard.61
In United States v. Agurs, the Court addressed some of the pragmatic 
concerns with the differing situations in which a prosecutor withholds 
information favorable to the accused.
  The petitioner’s due process rights had been 
violated, and a new trial was required. 
62
 
55 Id. at 154. 
  The defendant in Agurs admitted to 
stabbing and killing the victim but argued that she had acted in self-defense.  
After conviction, the petitioner learned that the victim had a prior criminal 
56 Id. at 151–52. 
57 Id. at 154.  The result of Giglio’s holding relating to inducements is that prosecutors 
now make “implied inducements” by indicating that there will likely be some reward for 
testifying, yet stopping short of making an explicit promise.  This allows witnesses to testify 
honestly that they have not received any actual promises in exchange for testimony.  Legal 
scholars argue that courts should limit this practice.  See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of 
Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2004). 
58 [W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the 
prosecutor.  The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the 
Government.  A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the 
Government . . . .  To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures 
and regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure communication of all 
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.   
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. 
59 Id. at 153 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962)). 
60 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 Id. at 155. 
62 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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record that would tend to support the petitioner’s self-defense theory.63  The 
petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose this information to 
the defense violated her due process rights.64
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of due 
process because the trial judge remained convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the victim’s criminal record in 
the context of the trial.
 
65  In reaching this holding, however, it provided an 
instructive analytical breakdown of due process violations possible under 
Brady.  The Court observed that the rule established in Brady applies to 
three distinct situations, stating that “[e]ach involves the discovery, after 
trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown 
to the defense.”66
In the first situation, “the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the 
prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution 
knew, or should have known, of the perjury.”
 
67  In this scenario, the Court 
reiterated the materiality standard established in Giglio: that “a conviction 
obtained by knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and 
must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”68  The Court 
recognized that this was a strict standard of materiality, i.e., one that cuts in 
favor of the accused, and that this was appropriate because it followed the 
Mooney line of cases and reflected the value placed on the sanctity of “the 
truth-seeking function of the trial process.”69
In the second situation, a defendant makes a pretrial request for 





63 “[The victim’s] prior record included a plea of guilty to a charge of assault and 
carrying a deadly weapon in 1963 and another guilty plea to a charge of carrying a deadly 
weapon in 1997.  Apparently both weapons were knives.”  Id. at 100–01. 
  The Supreme Court highlighted the Brady decision’s focus on the 
fact that the evidence had been requested by the defendant and that it was 
64 There was substantial confusion in the lower courts’ opinions, demonstrating the need 
for some clarity and direction from the Supreme Court regarding due process violations in 
this context.  The district court rejected the Government’s argument that “there was no duty 
to disclose material evidence unless requested to do so,” but held that the evidence was not 
material.  Id. at 101–02.  The court of appeals found no misconduct by the prosecutor but 
held that “the evidence was material and that its nondisclosure required a new trial because 
the jury might have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been received.”  Id. 
65 Id. at 114. 
66 Id. at 103. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 104. 
70 Id. 
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material.71
The Court then turned to the third situation in which a Brady violation 
might occur, which applied to the factual scenario of Agurs.  In this 
situation, the defense made no request for exculpatory evidence at all, nor 
did it ask for “all Brady material” or “anything exculpatory.”
  The Court noted that materiality was established in Brady 
because the withheld evidence very likely had an impact on the jury’s 
punishment determination. 
72  The Court 
stated that under these circumstances, the mere possibility that a piece of 
withheld evidence might have helped the defense or impacted the outcome 
of the trial “does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”73  
However, the defendant “should not have to satisfy the severe burden of 
demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would have 
resulted in acquittal.”74  Though this would be the standard if the evidence 
was discovered from a neutral source, the fact that the given piece of 
evidence was “available to the prosecutor and not submitted to the defense 
places it in a different category.”75  Therefore, the Court established the 
materiality standard for this situation as whether the undisclosed evidence 
“creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”76
A comparison of the materiality standards for each of the three 
categories of Brady violations listed here illustrates the Supreme Court’s 
interest in placing the highest protection against a prosecutor’s knowing use 
of perjured testimony.  First, where a prosecutor knowingly presents false 
testimony, the test of materiality is whether there is “any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury.”
  The Court in 
Agurs held that the evidence of the victim’s criminal record did not do so. 
77  Second, where a defendant has made a specific request for 
evidence and the prosecutor has suppressed this evidence, the test of 
materiality is whether the evidence has an impact on the determination of 
guilt or of punishment.78
 
71 Id. 
  Third, where a defendant has not made a request 
at all, or has made only a general request for exculpatory evidence, the test 
72 Id. at 106 (“Such a request really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no 
request is made.”). 
73 Id. at 109–10. 
74 Id. at 111. 
75 Id. at 110–11 (“[T]he attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with 
earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that 
‘justice shall be done.’  He is the ‘servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.’”) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935)). 
76 427 U.S. at 111. 
77 Id. at 103. 
78 Id. at 106. 
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of materiality is whether the “omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt 
that did not otherwise exist.”79  These three tests of materiality sit on a 
continuum.  The first is a “strict standard of materiality” that is not 
permissive of the prosecution’s misconduct.80  A strict standard is 
appropriate in this circumstance because such a violation “involve[s] a 
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.”81  The second 
and third tests are more permissive of the prosecution’s withholding or 
suppression of evidence.82  There is necessarily more ambiguity involved in 
the degree unfairness inherent in a prosecutor’s withholding of a piece of 
evidence at the discovery phase.  Evidence that is clearly and 
unquestionably exculpatory will give rise to an obligation to divulge the 
evidence to the defense, but the impact of other evidence on the case may 
be difficult to predict at discovery.  As investigation proceeds and facts 
develop, the importance of a piece of evidence may increase or decrease.  
This ambiguity is compounded by a difficulty identified by Justice Marshall 
in his dissent to Agurs: if the evidence had been known to the defendant 
before the beginning of the trial, the defendant’s trial strategy may have 
been altogether different.83
All of the ambiguity involved in the factual scenario of a prosecutor’s 
withholding of evidence favorable to the accused during discovery 
necessitates a standard that is more flexible, or more permissive to the 
prosecutor’s decision to withhold.  Thus the Court requires reversal in these 
cases only when the withheld evidence would change the result of the trial 
or give rise to a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.  However, 
this ambiguity simply does not exist where a prosecutor knowingly uses 
perjured testimony during trial.  Either a prosecutor knows that a falsehood 
has been uttered in open court or he does not.  This allows for a materiality 
standard that is less flexible and permissive of a prosecutor’s discretion and 
more protective of the defendant on trial. 
 
 
79 Id. at 112. 
80 Id. at 104. 
81 Id.  The Court also noted that “a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured 
testimony is fundamentally unfair,” and quoted language from Mooney, which indicated that 
obtaining a conviction through the use of perjured testimony is “as inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of like result by intimidation.”  Id. 
82 It is not necessary to compare the relative “strictness” of the second and third 
scenarios.  The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bagley (discussed supra at note 48), 
combined these scenarios and applied a single materiality standard to both.  473 U.S. 667 
(1985). 
83 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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In United States v. Bagley, the Court further clarified the materiality 
standard according to the categories outlined in Agurs.84  The Court in 
Bagley developed the materiality standards used in assessing Brady 
violations by collapsing two of the Agurs categories into one.85  Notably, 
the Giglio materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured 
testimony remained intact.86  The Court created a new materiality test 
“sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’ ‘general request,’ and 
‘specific request’” scenarios relating to withholding of evidence claims.87  
The Court articulated the following standard for a prosecutor’s withholding 
of evidence favorable to the defendant: “The evidence is material only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.”88
The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred 
in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of 
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would 
have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete 
response.
  The Court echoed Justice Marshall’s concerns from his 
dissent in Agurs about a defendant making trial strategy decisions 
predicated on the assumption that evidence does not exist when the 
prosecution fails to respond to a request.  However, the Court asserted that 
this materiality standard allows for consideration of alterations in the 
defendant’s strategy: 
89
The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to apply the newly 
clarified standard and determine whether there was a reasonable probability 
 
 
84 473 U.S. 667 (1985).  The petitioner, Bagley, had been convicted of narcotics 
violations based on testimony from two informants who were working with the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.  Although counsel for the defense had made specific 
requests for “deals, promises or inducements” offered to the informants, the Government did 
not disclose the fact that the informants had in fact received payment for their assistance 
with the case and that their payment would be paid “commensurate with services and 
information rendered.”  The petitioner eventually learned of these contracts for payment 
after the trial as a result of a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.  Id. at 671. 
85 See Paul G. Nofer, Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose 
Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 DUKE L.J. 892 (1986) (asserting that 
the Bagley decision’s combination of these two Agurs categories is appropriate because the 
harm to the defendant is the same in a nondisclosure following either a specific request or a 
general request). 
86 473 U.S. at 682. 
87 Id. at 682. 
88 Id. (applying definition of “reasonable probability” from Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
89 473 U.S. at 683. 
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that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the withheld 
evidence been disclosed to the defense.90
D. THE DICTA THAT LED TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
In Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court compared the standard 
established under Bagley to harmless error analysis, and in so doing set out 
dicta that has led directly to the circuit split addressed in this Comment.91  
In this case, the State willfully withheld evidence tending to exculpate the 
accused and impeach witnesses, but the Court did not address this knowing 
presentation of false testimony.92
The Court applied the standard of materiality for withholding of 
evidence cases identified above: “[R]egardless of request, favorable 
evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by 
the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.’”
  After jettisoning any assessment of the 
first Agurs category of cases, the Court turned to the Bagley decision to 
elaborate on the rule and analysis that Bagley compels. 
93  Critically, once a reviewing court has found constitutional 
error under Bagley, there is no need for further harmless error review.94  
The Bagley standard for materiality “necessarily entails the conclusion that 
the suppression must have had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jury’s verdict.’”95  Applying this framework, the Kyles 
Court held that, viewed together, the collective impact of the suppressed 
evidence required a new trial.96
The dicta set out by the Supreme Court in Kyles that has precipitated 
the circuit split regards the Court’s assertion that a finding of materiality 
under Bagley forecloses any further harmless error review.  The specific 
language used by the Court is as follows: “Assuming, arguendo, that a 





90 Id. at 684. 
  The Court explained that where the Bagley standard applies, 
any harmless error analysis would be meaningless because an offense has to 
91 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
92 There was a question as to a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in 
this case regarding eyewitness testimony, but this issue was not before the Court.  Id. at 433 
n.7. 
93 Id. at 433. 
94 Id. at 436. 
95 Id. (quoting the harmless error review standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 623 (1993)). 
96 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454. 
97 Id. at 435. 
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rise beyond the harmless error standard to meet the Bagley materiality 
standard.98  The standard for harmless error, established in Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict,”99 while the standard for 
materiality under Bagley is “whether, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”100
The Court’s illustration of the comparative strictness of these two 
standards has been interpreted by two circuit courts as an endorsement of 
the applicability of a Brecht harmless error analysis where a prosecutor has 
withheld evidence or presented perjured testimony.  The First and Sixth 
Circuits have each reasoned that, since the Supreme Court stated that a 
withholding of evidence error could not be treated as harmless, it is 
appropriate to analyze whether a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of 
perjured testimony could be treated as harmless.
 
101  These courts reasoned 
that it is possible to meet the materiality standard (whether the false 
testimony “could have affected the judgment of the jury”) but fail to rise 
beyond the harmless error standard (whether the false testimony “had 
substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict”).  Thus, 
relying on Kyles, these circuit courts have established a two-step analysis 
for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony.  First, the court analyzes 
whether the standard of materiality has been met, and second, the court 
analyzes whether the constitutional violation is nonetheless harmless 
error.102
Whether or not this two-step test is appropriate, Kyles does not provide 
a principled justification for making such an analysis.  In Kyles, the 
Supreme Court conspicuously refused to analyze the prosecutor’s knowing 
use of false testimony, and only made a comparison between the Bagley 
materiality standard and harmless error analysis.  It did not assert that 
harmless error analysis would be appropriate in this sort of case and 
preceded its analysis with the clause “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that a 




98 Id. at 435–36. 
 
99 507 U.S. at 776 (1993). 
100 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
101 See discussion of Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) and Gilday 
v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995), supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268. 
103 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. 
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In the Ninth Circuit case Hayes v. Brown,104 the prosecutor knowingly 
presented false testimony, and the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder.105  In determining whether reversal was required, the Hayes court 
applied the materiality standard first articulated in Giglio, looking to see 
whether there was “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 
have affected the judgment of the jury.”106  The prosecutor in Hayes 
knowingly elicited testimony that made a false representation as to the key 
witness’s motive to testify.  The court found that the knowing presentation 
of perjured testimony cleared the bar of the materiality standard and 
required the case to be retried.107
In assessing this case in the context of the circuit split regarding a 
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony, it is helpful to note 
that the Ninth Circuit relied on jurisprudence that strongly supports reversal 
under these circumstances.  The Hayes court quoted language stating that 
where a perjured testimony violation is found, “the conviction must be set 
aside.”
 
108  The court also quoted persuasive authority from the Second 
Circuit stating, “[i]ndeed, if it is established that the government knowingly 
permitted the introduction of false testimony reversal is ‘virtually 
automatic.’”109
 
104 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  For commentary on the Ninth Circuit’s 
unique en banc practices, see Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or 
Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2006) (asserting that in the Ninth Circuit, a full en banc 
is not practicable given that there are twenty-eight active circuit judges, yet the limited en 
banc is based on the false premise that some limited number of judges can speak for the 
entire court). 
  Reliance on this authority indicates that the court was 
particularly amenable to the idea of reversal and a finding of materiality.  
The court’s attitude is meaningful since the materiality standard is abstract 
by nature and invites an exercise of judicial discretion. 
105 The prosecutor in Hayes took steps to simultaneously induce the key witness to testify 
and to bolster this witness’s credibility.  The prosecutor reached an agreement with the 
witness’s attorney to dismiss felony charges in exchange for the testimony, but bound the 
attorney not to tell the witness about the agreement.  This way the witness could testify 
honestly that he had not received any inducements and thus would appear more credible to 
the jury.  The prosecutor then made statements to the court that “There has [sic] been 
absolutely no negotiations whatsoever in regard to [the witness’s] testimony.”  Further, the 
prosecutor elicited testimony at trial that the witness had not been promised anything in 
exchange for his testimony.  399 F.3d at 979–80. 
106 Id. at 984. 
107 Id. at 985. 
108 Id. at 984 (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
109 Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978 (quoting United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 
1991)). 
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The Hayes court then addressed directly whether a finding of 
materiality is sufficient to warrant reversal, or whether it is necessary to 
further determine whether the error was harmless under Brecht.  The Ninth 
Circuit looked to Kyles for guidance and found that “for all errors that 
derived from the Agurs materiality standard, there was no need to conduct a 
separate Brecht analysis.”110  Where the Supreme Court has established a 
materiality standard, there is no further need for Brecht analysis.111
Diverging from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the First Circuit and, 
more recently, the Sixth Circuit have relied on Kyles as authority for 
establishing a two-step test for determining whether a prosecutor’s knowing 
use of false testimony requires reversal.  Both the First and Sixth Circuit 
tests first determine whether the violation satisfies the Giglio materiality 
standard, and second determine whether the violation is harmless error 
under Brecht.  In the First Circuit decision, Gilday v. Callahan, the 
defendant’s two co-conspirators testified erroneously at trial that they had 
not been offered deals in exchange for their testimony, and the prosecution 
failed to correct these perjured statements.
 
112  Further, the Government 
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence from three eyewitnesses.113
The framework used by the Gilday court in assessing these potential 
Brady violations is substantially different from the framework used by the 
Ninth Circuit in Hayes.  The Hayes court viewed the application of a one-
step test in Kyles, solely concerned with a finding of materiality, as 
requiring reversal no matter whether a prosecutor had withheld favorable 
evidence or presented perjured testimony.  The Gilday court, however, saw 
an analytical difference between withholding evidence and presenting 
perjured testimony, allowing for different tests to determine whether 
reversal is necessary.  The Gilday court noted that where a prosecutor has 
knowingly presented perjured testimony, “a petitioner is given the benefit 





110 Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985 (relying on reasoning set out in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 436 (1995)).  For a more detailed discussion of Brecht’s interaction with the materiality 
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony, see infra notes 
  The materiality standard for the knowing use of perjured 
testimony (whether the false testimony could reasonably be said to have 
impacted the judgment of the jury) is more “friendly” to the petitioner than 
is the Brecht harmless error standard (whether the perjured testimony in fact 
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict).  
152–56 
and accompanying text. 
111 399 F.3d at 985. 
112 Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 1995). 
113 Id. at 267. 
114 Id. at 268. 
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Thus, in this situation, “it is quite possible to find a constitutional violation, 
but to conclude that it was harmless.”115
In order to justify the application of a harmless error standard in this 
context, the Gilday court relied on the Kyles reasoning that “the 
[withholding of favorable evidence] materiality standard necessarily 
requires a court to find an impact on the jury verdict sufficiently substantial 
to satisfy the Brecht harmless error test.”  Yet, the Gilday court reasoned 
that the perjured testimony materiality standard, being more “friendly” to 
the petitioner, does not necessarily entail satisfaction of the Brecht harmless 
error test.  Thus the Gilday court explained this new two-part test in the 
following way: “When faced with such a claim, therefore, our inquiry is 
necessarily two-pronged: was there failure to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence, and, if yes, was such a failure harmless?”
 
116  The Gilday court, in 
applying this new two-pronged analysis, found that the knowing 
presentation of false testimony claims passed the materiality test but failed 
the harmless error analysis.  Thus, the court found “no remediable Brady 
violation.”117  The method in which the court disposed of the Brady 
violations established a completely new two-part analysis, purportedly 
rooted in the then-recent Supreme Court cases of Brecht and Kyles.118
The most recent case in the circuit split on this issue, Rosencrantz v. 
Lafler,
 
119 followed Gilday’s lead in applying a two-step test for a 
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony.  The sexual assault 
victim in Rosencrantz had erroneously denied going to the prosecutor’s 
office in advance of the trial and denied sitting in the prosecutor’s office on 
the day of the trial.120  “The prosecutor remained silent during this colloquy 
and never reopened the topic during the trial.”121
In analyzing this instance of knowing use of false testimony, the 
Rosencrantz court began by reiterating the materiality standard outlined in 
Giglio, that a “conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured 





117 Id. at 272. 
118 Gilday was decided in July 1995.  Id. at 257.  Kyles was decided in April 1995.  514 
U.S. 419, 419 (1995).  Brecht was decided in 1993.  507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993) 
119 Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009). 
120 Id. at 580. 
121 Id. at 581.  The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the victim 
testified and admitted that she had met “with the prosecutor . . . and several police officers 
approximately three times prior to trial . . . .”  Id. at 582.  The district court found this to be 
credible and the state did not offer any evidence or testimony as rebuttal.  Thus, the court 
“concluded that the prosecution allowed false testimony to stand uncorrected when [the 
victim] denied any pretrial meetings.”  Id. at 583. 
686 CHARLIE DEVORE [Vol. 101 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”122  The court 
then drew a distinction between cases in which a prosecutor knowingly 
used perjured testimony (which the court called “Brady/Giglio” cases) and 
cases in which a prosecutor has withheld evidence favorable to the accused 
(which the court referred to as simply “Brady claims”).  The court stated 
that “in these Brady/Giglio claims, the materiality assessment is less 
stringent than that for more general Brady withholding of evidence 
claims.”123  The court then drew a questionable conclusion, relying in part 
on the persuasive authority of the Gilday decision: “[W]hile a traditional 
Brady materiality analysis obviates a later harmless-error review under 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, courts may excuse Brady/Giglio violations 
involving known and materially false statements as harmless error.”124
In addition to the Gilday framework, the court included a reference to 
Carter v. Mitchell
 
125 to support its decision.126  The court’s reference to 
Carter is suspect, given the court’s statement on the previous page of the 
opinion that “Carter summarily cited harmless error as an alternative basis 
for denying a false-testimony claim, and this circuit has yet to explicitly 
hold that a knowing-presentation-of-false-testimony due process violation 
should be reviewed for harmless error.”127
The Rosencrantz court also referenced Kyles to justify this rule.  In a 
footnote, it quoted the Kyles analysis that meeting the traditional Brady 
materiality standard necessarily compels the conclusion that the error has 
met the harmless error standard.
  Thus the Carter decision did not 




122 Id. (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). 
  The court made a significant leap in 
logic that is not warranted by the Kyles decision by implying that Kyles 
approved of a harmless error review for traditional Brady claims, and only 
123 568 F.3d at 584. 
124 Id. 
125 443 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2006).  In Carter, the Sixth Circuit denied a habeas corpus 
petition on the grounds that the petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective and there were 
independent and adequate state grounds to uphold the conviction.  The court found that the 
prosecutor’s failure to correct misleading statements by a key prosecution witness did not 
meet the Giglio materiality standard.  Id. at 535–36. 
126 Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 584. 
127 Id. at 583.  The Rosencrantz court’s pincite reference includes an explanation in 
Carter that the knowing use of false testimony in that case did not meet the materiality 
standard articulated in Giglio and then goes on to say: “Moreover, for these same reasons, 
any constitutional error would have been harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson.”  Carter, 
443 F.3d at 537 (citation omitted). 
128 Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 584 n.1. 
2011] A LIE IS A LIE 687 
disregarded harmless error review in these circumstances because the Brady 
materiality standard surpasses the harmless error standard.129
Having established this framework, the Rosencrantz court went on to 
find that the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false evidence was 
material, and yet excusable as harmless error.
 
130  Interestingly, the court did 
not seem overly concerned with whether the knowing presentation of 
perjured testimony was material.  In its introductory statements, the court 
stated, “[W]e affirm the district court’s denial of Rosencrantz’s petition 
because, even assuming the materiality of the testimony at issue, the 
prosecutorial misconduct qualifies as harmless under Brecht v. 
Abrahamson.”131  In addressing the materiality of this violation, the court 
observed that the perjury itself (the victim’s assertion that she did not have 
pretrial meetings with the prosecutor regarding her testimony when in fact 
she did) was relatively minor in this case.132  However, the jury could have 
been impacted if the victim had been confronted with her perjury in court.  
“[I]t is reasonable to infer that exposing [the victim] as untruthful—thereby 
tipping the jury to another of [her] inconsistencies and her willingness to lie 
under oath—would have affected the jury’s view of [her] credibility.”133  
Rather than making a finding of materiality, the court stated, “Here, we will 
assume that [the victim’s] lie about the pretrial meeting is material.”134
Essentially, the Rosencrantz court applied a two-step test identical to 
the test set out in Gilday.  However, the Sixth Circuit advanced the 
argument in favor of the two-step test by appealing to the policy concerns 
that underpin the Brecht decision.  The court asserted that a stringent 
harmless error standard is appropriate as a second step because it “honors 
  The 
fact that the victim’s perjury did not have an overwhelming impact on the 
result of the trial allowed the court to be flexible in its application of the 
materiality standard and establish a new Sixth Circuit rule of applying 
harmless error analysis to these types of cases. 
 
129 See discussion of Kyles v. Whitley, supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text, 
pointing out that the Kyles comparison of the Brady standard and the harmless error standard 
was preceded by the clause, “Assuming, arguendo, that a harmless-error enquiry were to 
apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as harmless . . . .”  514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).  
Thus, Kyles did not command that harmless error analysis applied under these 
circumstances. 
130 568 F.3d at 591. 
131 Id. at 580. 
132 Id. at 588 (“Given the implausibility of the untruthful answer Lasky gave—jurors 
would expect the prosecuting witness to meet with the prosecution before trial—we might 
assess the impact as minimal.”). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (emphasis added).  Further, the court begins its “Harmless Error” section with the 
words “Having assumed materiality and therefore assumed a constitutional error . . . .”  Id. 
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Brecht’s weighty concerns,” including the state’s interest in finality, 
expenditure of time and resources of retrial, erosion of memory and 
dispersion of witnesses, and society’s interest in the prompt administration 
of justice.135
The dissent in Rosencrantz argued that a finding of materiality 
necessarily forecloses any harmless error analysis, regardless of the relative 
comparison of the materiality and harmless error standards.
  This rationale supports applying a stringent standard 
generally, but the Rosencrantz majority opinion did not endeavor to balance 
the policy concerns it identified against the due process protections set in 
place by the Giglio standard for materiality where a prosecutor has 
knowingly used false testimony. 
136  Cases 
involving certain prosecutorial misconduct “can so undermine confidence in 
a verdict and impact the fairness of a trial that a new trial is required.”137  
Thus the majority’s application of a harmless error standard was 
inappropriate.  The Supreme Court has articulated and developed 
materiality standards for the Brady line of cases.  Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to treat “Brady and its associated line of cases as providing 
merely a threshold test for Brecht’s harmless-error analysis.”138
Given the conceptual framework of Brady and Brecht, we should not shoehorn Brady 
into Brecht’s harmless-error analysis.  Rather, Brady and Brecht remain consistent 
only so long as they stand apart.  The Court’s only task in the present case, then, is to 
apply the Giglio test.  If the test is satisfied, a new trial is required.
  The dissent 
argued that it is inappropriate to combine Brady and Brecht into a single 
analytical framework: 
139
Since the Supreme Court has set out a specific materiality standard for 
a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony, according to the dissent, 
it is inappropriate to apply an additional test that erodes the standard 
established by the Supreme Court. 
 
IV. ROSENCRANTZ AND GILDAY ARE DEAD (OR THEY SHOULD BE) 
A. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IS UNAMBIGUOUS IN ITS 
REQUIREMENT OF A ONE-STEP MATERIALITY TEST FOR PERJURED 
TESTIMONY 
The Supreme Court has never established or affirmed a two-part test 
for determining when reversal is appropriate in the case of a prosecutor’s 
 
135 Id. at 589–90. 
136 Id. at 592 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 593. 
139 Id. at 594 (internal quotations omitted). 
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knowing use of perjured testimony.  A comprehensive look at the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in this factual scenario shows the careful development 
of a materiality standard that best reflects the Court’s desire to uphold the 
truthseeking process of a criminal trial.  In the 1935 case of Mooney v. 
Holohan, the Supreme Court first asserted that a prosecutor’s deliberate 
presentation of perjured testimony is “as inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”140  
For the next thirty-seven years, the Supreme Court endeavored to clarify the 
triggering circumstances that compel a new trial when the prosecutor has 
knowingly presented perjured testimony.  In Alcorta, the Court’s analysis 
indicated that there would be no per se rule of reversal, but rather a 
reviewing court must consider the impact of the falsehood on the jury.141  
The Alcorta majority also found that a prosecutor’s failure to correct false 
testimony will be treated the same as a prosecutor’s presentation of false 
testimony.142  In Napue, the Court stated that this protection applies against 
false testimony that is presented whether it is material to the defendant’s 
guilt or to the witness’s credibility.143  And in Brady, the Court applied this 
protection whether it would impact the fact-finder’s finding of guilt, or only 
the determination of punishment.144  After thirty-seven years of developing 
the doctrine in this area, the Supreme Court articulated the materiality 
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony in the 1971 case 
Giglio v. United States. “A new trial is required if the false testimony 
could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury.”145
The materiality standard, carefully developed by the Court and set out 
in Giglio, has remained in force for the last thirty-nine years and is still 
good law today.  In fact, both the Gilday and Rosencrantz courts recognized 




140 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
  There is good authority for 
deploying the Giglio materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of 
false testimony and using it as the standard for determining when the due 
process rights of a criminal defendant have been violated in a way that 
demands a new trial.  However, there is no Supreme Court jurisprudence 
authorizing the second step of the test employed by Gilday and 
Rosencrantz.  The harmless error analysis as applied in those decisions 
141 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957). 
142 Id. at 30–31. 
143 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
144 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962). 
145 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotations omitted). 
146 See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 
F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995).  
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completely swallows the materiality standard that has been carefully 
considered by the Supreme Court and has withstood the test of time. 
Both the Gilday and Rosencrantz decisions relied on the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Kyles as authority for applying the second step of their 
test, the harmless error analysis.  Two aspects of the Kyles decision 
undercut the validity of relying on it as authority for modifying the 
materiality test for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony.  First, 
Kyles was not a case about a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony.  
In Kyles, the prosecution withheld evidence that was favorable to the 
defendant, and the opinion clarified confusion in the lower court’s opinion 
about applying the materiality standard for withheld evidence under Brady 
and Bagley.147  Since Kyles was not a case about a prosecutor’s knowing 
presentation of false testimony, it cannot be said to set out a rule for this 
context.  In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Kyles opinion 
that it was not addressing knowing use of perjured testimony.148
Secondly, in Kyles the Court compared the standard of materiality to 
the harmless error standard, but it did not assert that both of these standards 
should be used to analyze either withholding of evidence or knowing use of 
perjured testimony.  It seems that there are two purposes for the Court’s 
comparison of these standards.  First, the court of appeals had applied both 
Bagley materiality and harmless error review, and the Supreme Court was 
illustrating that this was illogical.  Since the Bagley materiality standard is 
stricter than the harmless error standard, any withholding of evidence that 
satisfied Bagley materiality would necessarily satisfy the harmless error 
standard.
 
149  Secondly, the Supreme Court had provided a new formulation 
of harmless error just two years before the Kyles decision in Brecht.  The 
Supreme Court was likely trying to provide some guidance to courts 
applying each of these standards in the future.  Materiality (and harmless 
error) standards are abstract by their nature.  Comparison of two abstract 
standards provides some guideposts to lower courts in determining which 
standards are more or less strict.  In Kyles, the Court demonstrated that it 
was merely providing instructive analysis through dicta rather than 
authorizing application with its statement, “Assuming, arguendo, that a 
harmless-error enquiry were to apply . . . .”150
The Sixth Circuit specifically endorsed the application of harmless 
error analysis in Rosencrantz because it honors “Brecht’s weighty 
 
 
147 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435–38 (1995). 
148 Id. at 433 n.7. (“[W]e do not consider the question whether Kyles’s conviction was 
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony and our decision today does not address 
any claim under the first Agurs category.”). 
149 Id. at 435. 
150 Id. 
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concerns.”151  In Brecht, the harmless error standard articulated by the 
Court is whether the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”152  The First and Sixth Circuit 
rely on the authority of Brecht.  However, the factual scenario in Brecht is 
fundamentally different from cases in which a prosecutor has knowingly 
presented false testimony at trial.  Brecht was a case in which the prosecutor 
used a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant’s claim 
that a shooting was accidental.153  This is significantly different from any 
sort of Brady violation in that the Supreme Court has not separately 
established a materiality standard for a Miranda violation, and therefore it 
was appropriate in Brecht for the Court to establish a general catch-all 
harmless error standard.154
As Justice O’Connor observed in her dissent to Brecht, “Miranda is a 





151 Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589. 
  Setting aside for a moment the justifications for the Miranda 
protection, it is clear that without this rule more information would be 
known to authorities more quickly regarding a crime.  Thus, Miranda sets 
up an impediment to truthseeking in the name of protection of the rights of 
arrestees.  The Brady line of cases does just the opposite.  That is, Brady 
affords for an enhancement to the truthseeking function of a criminal trial.  
When a prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence in a case, he is 
obligated to turn this evidence over to the accused.  Where a prosecutor 
hears testimony that he knows to be perjured in open court, he is obligated 
to correct it.  For these reasons, the application of Brecht’s standard is 
wholly inappropriate.  Since the Supreme Court has articulated a specific 
materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false 
testimony, it is appropriate to apply only that materiality standard and not to 
erode it with an additional layer of harmless error review.  Indeed, if not for 
the dicta from the Kyles case, circuit courts would not likely consider 
applying Brecht’s standard for harmless error in the first place. 
152 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 624 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
153 Id. at 624–26.  
154 Or, more accurately, it was appropriate for the Court to develop the then-existing 
harmless error standard to reflect policy concerns.  For a summary of the development of the 
harmless error standard, see Ana M. Otero, In Harm’s Way—A Dismal State of Justice: The 
Legal Odyssey of Cesar Fierro, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 119, 135–49 (2005). 
155 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 651 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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B. ANY AMBIGUITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD BE RESOLVED 
IN FAVOR OF A SINGULAR MATERIALITY STANDARD 
The First and Sixth Circuits have read some ambiguity into the 
Supreme Court’s comparison of the Bagley materiality standard and the 
Brecht harmless error standard in Kyles.  They posit that since the standard 
for the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of perjured testimony is more 
“friendly”156
1. Tests Should Be Compared on the Grounds of Protectiveness of Due 
Process and Not in Terms of Strictness 
 to the defendant than the materiality standard for withholding 
of evidence favorable to the accused, an additional layer of harmless error 
analysis is warranted.  This Comment has argued that no such ambiguity 
exists in the jurisprudence.  However, if any ambiguity can be found in the 
Kyles opinion, it should be resolved in favor of protecting the due process 
rights of the criminal defendant by refusing to apply a second layer of 
harmless error analysis after a finding of materiality. 
The Gilday court refers to the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s 
knowing use of false testimony as “more favorable to the defendant”157 than 
the standard for a prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence and 
further refers to the standard as a “lower materiality hurdle.”158  The 
Rosencrantz court refers to this materiality standard as “less stringent”159 
and as “friendly-to-the-accused.”160  This portrayal is an incomplete 
characterization of the materiality standard for perjured testimony.  When 
compared to the materiality standard for withheld evidence, it is true that 
the standard for perjured testimony presents a lower bar for the accused to 
meet.  But it is a lower bar because the Supreme Court has carefully 
considered the scenarios in which a violation of the materiality standard 
might occur and the constitutional protections at play, and determined that 
this standard is appropriately protective and practicable.161
The materiality standard for withheld evidence grew out of the 




156 Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268 (1st Cir. 1995). 
  But the 
Supreme Court carefully analyzed and differentiated the two situations in 
Agurs and Bagley and articulated that because of practical considerations, a 
157 Id. at 267. 
158 Id. at 268. 
159 Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2009). 
160 Id. at 587. 
161 See discussion of Supreme Court cases developing the materiality standard for a 
prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony, supra text at notes 141–46. 
162 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962). 
2011] A LIE IS A LIE 693 
more stringent standard should be applied in the case of withheld evidence.  
A prosecutor is not likely to know the worth of each piece of evidence to 
the defendant’s case during the discovery phase and should not be asked to 
open his file to the defense.163  Because of this consideration, a higher bar 
must be met to demonstrate the unfairness of the prosecutor’s withholding 
of a piece of evidence.  These practical considerations do not temper the 
protections in place against a prosecutor presenting false testimony in open 
court.  If a witness lies on the stand, and the prosecutor knows it, he must 
correct the lie.  Any other action would offend the truthseeking nature of the 
trial and the pursuit of justice.  Or, put another way, it would not advance 
the prosecutor’s “twofold aim . . . that guilt shall not escape [n]or innocence 
suffer.”164
The Supreme Court has established that a prosecutor’s knowing use of 
false testimony violates the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of a 
criminal defendant.  Therefore, couching the materiality standard on a scale 
of “strict” to “weak” obscures the reason that the materiality standard is in 
place.  More appropriately, the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s 
knowing use of perjured testimony should be considered on a scale of 
protectiveness of due process rights of the criminal defendant.  The perjured 
testimony materiality standard is more protective of due process rights than 
the withheld evidence standard because of the difficulties inherent in 
determining the weight of evidence before the commencement of the trial.  
The fact that this carefully considered materiality standard is more 
protective of due process rights should not permit courts to undercut its 
protection by imposing an additional harmless error analysis. 
 
2. A Singular Materiality Test Would Check the Trend of Eroding  
Habeas Relief 
All of the cases discussed in this Comment reached federal courts on 
habeas corpus petitions in which the petitioners alleged that their due 
process rights had been violated under the U.S. Constitution.  The habeas 
process is a safeguard to a criminal defendant and allows federal courts to 
review state courts’ analyses of due process violations and to command 
retrial if it is found that due process rights have been violated.  Legal 
 
163 See Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 699 (1985) (asserting that the state should 
turn over any evidence that might allow a defendant “whose liberty as at stake” to defend 
himself but that an “open file policy” would be too broad to achieve this goal).  But see 
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 492–98, 511–14 
(2009) (arguing that the Brady rule should be replaced with an open file policy because the 
current disclosure requirements may result in even ethical prosecutors under-disclosing 
exculpatory evidence). 
164 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). 
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scholars have observed a recent trend of federal courts substantially limiting 
habeas review, largely motivated by the passing of Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996.165  AEDPA, along with the 
1989 case of Teague v. Lane,166 favors judicial efficiency over the rights of 
the habeas petitioner.167  Teague bars federal courts from hearing claims 
that rest on recent Supreme Court cases and additionally bars a court from 
announcing a new rule in a habeas case and then using it to resolve a 
prisoner’s claim.168  AEDPA further limits habeas review by creating a 
statute of limitations for habeas petitions (none existed before AEDPA was 
passed),169 and substantially limiting a federal court from rehearing a claim 
in a successive petition for habeas corpus.170
Congress’s aim in passing AEDPA was to “streamline the habeas 
corpus process and to reduce the number of frivolous petitions.”
 
171  Scholar 
JoAnn Lee employed an empirical framework to analyze the impacts of 
Teague and AEDPA, using formulas to assess the habeas success rate, filing 
rate, and disposal time.172  She found the real impact of AEDPA was that it 
decreased the probability of success in obtaining habeas relief.173
 
165 See, e.g., Matthew K. Mulder, Finding the “Eternal and Unremitting Force” of 
Habeas Corpus: § 2254(d) and the Need for De Novo Review, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1179 
(2009) (arguing that the federal courts do not currently sufficiently protect due process rights 
of habeas petitioners because of inconsistent application of de novo review under AEDPA 
§2254(d)); Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
limited habeas relief by curtailing equitable tolling available under AEDPA).  But see John 
H. Blume,  AEDPA: the “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 260–64 (2006) 
(asserting that, to date, AEDPA has had very little impact on federal courts’ review of 
habeas petitions; however, ambiguities in the Act could lead to increased impact). 
 
166 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
167 JoAnn Lee, An Empirical Analysis of Habeas Corpus: The Impact of Teague v. Lane 
and the Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act on Habeas Petition Success Rates and 
Judicial Efficiency, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665 (2006). 
168 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–01 (establishing that a new rule should have a 
prospective, and not retrospective, impact).  “Given the broad scope of constitutional issues 
cognizable on habeas, . . . it is sounder in adjudicating habeas petitions generally to apply the 
law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of the habeas 
case on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.”  Id. at 306 (internal 
citations omitted). 
169 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2006). 
170 Id. 
171 Lee, supra note 167, at 669; see also Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, 
Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 506 (2007) (asserting that under AEDPA 
Congress intended, and federal courts have applied, limitations on habeas review). 
172 Lee, supra note 167, at 675. 
173 Id. at 684.  Lee further found that Teague actually increased the burden of habeas 
litigation on federal courts by increasing the amount of time it takes to dispose of habeas 
petitions.  Id. 
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Because of the trend of a decreasing likelihood of success through the 
habeas process, it is critical to strengthen the protection of due process 
rights.  Habeas petitioners are becoming statistically less likely to succeed 
in obtaining habeas relief.174  Therefore, it is important that the 
jurisprudence establishes a clear, consistent rule that protects the rights of 
criminal defendants at trial.  It is not appropriate to erode the materiality 
standard in cases where prosecutors have violated Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights of criminal defendants, regardless of whether the trend of 
limiting habeas review is appropriate.175
The cases overturned by the work of the Innocence Project also 
underscore the importance of protecting criminal defendants against this 
type of due process violation.  The Innocence Project was founded eighteen 
years ago to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA 
testing.
  The slippery slope toward a pure 
interest in judicial efficiency must be stopped where the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants have been violated so flagrantly. 
176  According to the Innocence Project website, “[t]here have been 
251 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States history.”177  The 
scientific basis proving the innocence of these prisoners creates a unique 
opportunity to analyze and compare the cases of criminal defendants who 
were wrongfully convicted.  In a survey of the first seventy-four DNA 
exonerations, the Innocence Project found that there had been knowing use 
of perjured testimony in a full 25% of those cases.178
3. The Singular Materiality Standard Would Have a Prophylactic Effect on 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
  It is impossible to 
ascertain whether the sample set of defendants who have been exonerated 
through the work of the Innocence Project is representative of all prisoners 
who have been wrongfully convicted, but the numbers do show that a 
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony is a significant problem, and 
that it can easily lead to a false conviction.  Whether a defendant is innocent 
or guilty, it is unacceptable to tip the balance toward the prosecution by 
eroding the protection against the use of false testimony. 
The jurisprudence surrounding Brady violations goes to great lengths 
to clarify that the reversal of a case for a Brady violation is not tied to a 
 
174 Id. at 682–83. 
175 See Otero, supra note 154, at 161–69 (arguing that the application of additional 
harmless error analysis to constitutional error is ominous given that habeas relief is fast-
eroding). 
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prosecutor’s culpability but rather is measured in regard to its impact on the 
fairness of the trial.179
A prosecutor who violates due process rights by presenting false 
testimony technically opens himself to ethical sanctions under the 
applicable state rule against prosecutorial misconduct.  Most state ethics 
rules regulating prosecutors are based on the American Bar Association 
Model Rule 3.8, which includes the mandate that prosecutors “make timely 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense.”
  However, where a prosecutor willfully exercised bad 
faith in withholding evidence, the Brady violation is likely more egregious.  
If evidence is particularly exculpatory, or if perjured testimony is critical on 
a key issue in a case, a prosecutor’s misconduct with regard to these items 
will have a more extreme impact on the case. 
180  However, Professor Niki Kuckes181 has argued that 
prosecutorial ethics are generally not well-regulated.182  Professor Kuckes 
notes that enforcement and revision of rules governing prosecutorial ethics 
is problematic because these rules “tend to antagonize a powerful lobby, 
and because political sensitivity inevitably accompanies any efforts to 
regulate law enforcement.”183
Additionally, disciplinary committees infrequently sanction 
prosecutors who violate Brady rules.
  Since there are inherent difficulties in 
regulating prosecutorial misconduct via ethics sanctions, the strict rule 
argued for in this Comment will provide a needed disincentive. 
184
 
179 The initial articulation of the materiality standard in Brady included the phrase: 
“irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1962).  
  Professor Sara Gurwitch asserts 
that the lack of disciplinary committee action is unsurprising given that the 
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009). 
181 In 1999, the American Bar Association commissioned Professor Kuckes to complete 
a report on the effects and implementation of state ethics rules regulating prosecutorial 
ethics.  In her report, Professor Kuckes suggested modifications to Rule 3.8 based on areas 
of prosecutorial conduct not covered by the rule, yet addressed by various state rules.  
Despite a thorough reform of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2000, Rule 
3.8 remained unchanged.  Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform 
Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 430–31 (2009). 
182 Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV., 
1573 (2003) (arguing that Rule 3.8 is inadequate to regulate prosecutorial misconduct). 
183 Kuckes, supra note 181, at 433. 
184 Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 316.  Richard Rosen and Joseph Weeks have completed 
exhaustive studies of the frequency of disciplinary sanctions in response to Brady violations, 
finding that “disciplinary committee action in response to Brady violations is uncommon 
and, when it occurs, mild.”  Id. at 317 (citing Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a 
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 883 (1997)); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions 
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987). 
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majority of disciplinary actions involve financial matters.185  Those criminal 
defendants wronged by Brady violations will typically “seek to be 
vindicated by the courts” rather than by filing disciplinary actions.186
In practical terms, the rule argued for in this Comment would not 
create a sea change in the treatment of cases where a prosecutor has 
knowingly used false testimony.  The cases in which a prosecutor 
knowingly presents perjured testimony and the testimony is not 
overwhelmingly material or immaterial are a small subset of those cases in 
which it can be proven that a prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony.
  Since 
disciplinary sanctions are mild and rare, it is appropriate for the courts to 
protect against prosecutorial misconduct by upholding a stringent standard 
against a prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony. 
187
The prophylactic effect of the clarification of this materiality standard 
would be far reaching.  The threat of reversal would motivate prosecutors to 
pay careful attention to ensuring that they do not present perjury (or let 
perjury go uncorrected) at trial.  It is inappropriate to follow the majority’s 
analysis in Rosencrantz, which effectively sends a message to prosecutors 
that some conduct that is recognized as being unconstitutional will be 
forgiven in the pursuit of justice.  Courts should not stand in as disciplinary 
committees, but they should apply a strict standard that prevents the 
knowing use of false testimony in pursuit of a criminal conviction. 
  There are relatively few cases in which a knowing use of 
perjury might meet the materiality standard yet fail harmless error review.  
Therefore, the rate of overturning individual cases would not change 
significantly with the enforcement of a singular materiality test for 
determining when a case should be overturned.  However, the existence of 
this clarification would likely make prosecutors more careful, and result in 
their erring on the side of caution and ensuring that they do not present 
testimony that they know to be false, under threat of reversal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The results of Rosencrantz and Gilday are inappropriate.  The Supreme 
Court should resolve the circuit split and establish that where a prosecutor 
knowingly presented false testimony at trial and the false testimony was 
material, there should be no further harmless error analysis. 
 
185 Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 317. 
186 Id. at 317. 
187 For an alternative explanation of why the rule advocated in this Comment will not 
cause a radical change in the rate of reversals, see Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 306 (“The 
prosecution’s Brady obligation is largely self-enforced . . . [a]s a result, the lack of 
compliance with the Brady rule will often go undetected, and it is fair to assume that most 
Brady violations go undiscovered.”). 
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The Court has developed jurisprudence tailoring the materiality 
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjury to best protect the due 
process rights of a criminal defendant.  Applying harmless error analysis as 
a second step in considering this type of complaint swallows the carefully 
considered materiality standard.  The Supreme Court jurisprudence in this 
area does not support the test established by the Rosencrantz and Gilday 
courts.  Further, the two-step test violates the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights of criminal defendants, offends the fundamental fairness and 
truthseeking power of the criminal trial, and erodes the incentive for 
prosecutors to be vigilant in ensuring they do not present false testimony. 
Eliminating the second step harmless error analysis is appropriate 
because it values the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant over 
judicial efficiency in this circumstance and it sends the appropriate message 
to prosecutors that knowing presentation of false testimony will not be 
tolerated. 
